This post is, verbatim, a final paper written for PHIL 2200: Continental Philosophy taken under Professor Danielle Lorenzini at Penn. This was really the first (or second counting the midterm) paper I've written of this kind, and I think both the process of writing it and the context explored was interesting.

A Framing and Defense of Existentialist Ethics Through a Bimodal View of Morality

Introduction

In this paper, I systematize and defend Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir's characterization of ethics under existentialist philosophy through Robin Zheng's formalization of the imperatival versus aspirational modes of morality in order to answer the question of whether existentialism can provide a sound ethical perspective in the affirmative. I will first introduce Sartre's and Beauvoir's views on how existentialism can provide ethical perspectives despite an absence of a priori moral principles. I will then outline Zheng's conception of the two modes of morality (and associated forms of moral criticism) within the first half of her paper Moral Criticism and Structural Injustice and situate the existing existentialist arguments within it. Finally, I will construct a framework for existentialist ethics under this bimodal view of morality and, through its defense, show that existentialism can indeed provide a sound ethical system.

Existentialism as a Sound Ethical System - What is Still Needed?

Sartre's Existentialism as a Humanism provides the groundwork for an ethical system under existentialism. Existentialism rejects the idea of a human essence that pre-exists existence and with it prior notions of ethical values. Individuals are "solely responsible for [their] own existence" (Sartre, 2007, p. 23). Through one's choices (and one's choices alone), one defines themselves, and in doing so defines what both themselves and others ought to be. Because one's choices are then reflected onto "humanity as a whole", he identifies a moral demand towards accepting responsibility for one's own freedom (p. 25). According to Sartre, one should not choose to deny their own freedom, acting in "bad faith", as this would be shirking this responsibility altogether (p. 47). Hence, freedom represents a unique normative value which is a basis for all other values.

Beauvoir concurs with Sartre in the necessity of embracing one's freedom, applying it to the oppression of women in The Second Sex and The Ethics of Ambiguity. While acknowledging that women (and the oppressed generally) do not have unrestricted freedom of choice to begin with, she maintains that this works in tandem with active cases of bad faith on the part of women as well. Furthermore, she claims that in the case of systemic repression of freedom of choice, the oppressed have the option of revolt, which functions as a proof of their freedom in the dearth of free recognition (de Beauvoir, 1953, 1972).

Despite this existentialist view of freedom as the ultimate normative value, this in-and-of-itself does not immediately translate into a viable moral system. It's left up to interpretation on how one can fairly use these values to morally critique themselves and others within a society, as well as how to apply them oneself to everyday situations. However, by systematizing its implications within a framework of aspirational versus imperatival morality, we are able to arrive at a more defensible and applicable formulation of existentialist ethics.

A Bimodal View of Morality

The notion of a separate aspirational notion of morality versus a duty-based or imperative notion is not new¹. In his 1965 book The Morality of Law, Lon L. Fuller advances a distinction between the "morality of aspiration" and the "morality of duty"². Morality of duty is, in short, mandatory, with a clear set of choices within any given situation delineated as wrong, and others perhaps as right or required. On a high level, they "condemn [men] for failing to represent the basic requirements of social living" (p. 6).

Morality of aspiration, on the contrary, calls on people to "realize [their] fullest capabilities", and corrects them "for shortcoming, not for wrongdoing" (Fuller, 2000, p. 5). Given limited agency in practice, people are essentially allowed to shirk "good" actions some of the time, as long as they "an attitude of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire and longing for an ideal as a model of excellence presently beyond those who strive for it" (Brownlee, 2010, p. 243). For example, people are generally expected to not lie or cheat in any given situation, thus forming an imperative moral ideal. However, a value such as transparency could be considered an aspirational ideal: not many moral systems would claim that saying everything that comes to mind all the time is strictly necessary to work towards transparency in good faith.

Robin Zheng, in her work Moral Criticism and Structural Injustice (2021), ties morality of duty, which she refers to as "imperatival morality", to the summative mode of moral criticism. Summative criticism is normally one of blame, judging actors for "wrong" choices made in any particular situation. It tends to follow a juridical mould (e.g. one of a justice system): X did wrong action Y and ought to be negatively sanctioned as a result (p. 506).

One strategy that she identifies for translating some combination of aspiratory and imperative ideals into a juridical setting, that is, establishing universal standards around these ideals for deciding when we should negatively judge someone, is the idea of perfect versus imperfect duties³. Perfect duties take the (imperative) form of "Always (or never) do x" while imperfect duties (representing aspiratory ideals) take the form "sometimes, to some extent, one ought to do x" (Zheng, 2021, p. 509).

However, Zheng notes that a "weak" conception of imperfect duties, which implies the existence of an "indeterminate minimum threshold of effort" (p. 509) necessary to reach the "sometimes" and avoid blame, is not sufficient to address aspirational morality. Aspirational ethics require moral agents to continue to pursue their aspirations even when well over the threshold. Instead, a "strong", aspirational conception of imperfect duties as unachievable ideals to perpetually strive towards is necessary. This aspirational morality lends itself better to another mode of moral criticism: formative criticism, which focuses on providing feedback for individual improvement over time rather than judgement and comparison to others. This type of criticism "exhibit[s] a logic of feedback", which recognizes a "discrepancy between actual and ideal performance" and provides information about the relevant ideal with "suggestions for improvement" (pp. 512-513).

Existentialism Under the Two Moralities

While not explicitly expressed within this framework, Sartre's views can still be situated in it. The strongest takeaway perhaps is that freedom as a normative value is imperative. He states "Man is a free being who, under any circumstances, can only ever will his freedom" (Sartre, 2007, p. 49). While there may be some "ongoing" aspect to the pursuit of freedom which aligns with an aspirational mode of ethics, Sartre expects people to choose freedom in any situation, and that promoting freedom as merely an aspiration to be pursued some of the time is understating his moral imperative. In addition, he universalizes the idea of freedom, claiming that one is "obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as [one wills their] own" (pp. 48-49) as one's freedom "depends entirely on the freedom of others" (p. 48). This implies a strong normative duty towards willing freedom towards both oneself and others: one cannot simply pursue these aspirations separately, but instead must act towards both at the same time or risk judgement (it is a clear wrong choice to only pursue one).

Furthermore, Sartre passes summative moral criticism on people acting in "bad faith": denying their own freedom. He writes "in the name of this will to freedom, implied by freedom itself, I can pass judgement on those who seek to conceal from themselves the complete arbitrariness of their existence, and their total freedom" (p. 49). This applies a juridical lens to bad faith actors. When they make the choice to not acknowledge their radical freedom, they can and ought to be summarily judged for doing so.

Beauvoir qualifies summative judgement on bad faith actors: certain social structures and power dynamics do restrict freedom and what options actors have in practice. She notes that women within a patriarchal society are sometimes bad faith actors and ought to be judged for yielding their freedom to it, but also sometimes cannot be judged due to their malformed option set. She states "the oppressor is lying if he claims that the oppressed positively wants oppression; he merely abstains from not wanting it because he is unaware of even the possibility of rejection" (de Beauvoir, 1972, p. 87). While Beauvouir maintains that constrained actors such as women have an imperative responsibility to embrace their freedom (de Beauvoir, 1953), summative moral criticism is not always necessary if they don't. Perhaps a formative, non-blaming approach is more appropriate: Beauvoir herself showed flashes of this in correspondence with married readers, expressing both "mutual disappointment" (Coffin, 2020, p. 178) with their misreadings and a consistent desire to correct them in a not-necessarily vindictive way.

In the existentialist view, while other values could still exist and be held meaningfully, they cannot be considered foundational or a priori – there is no essence proceeding existence from which they can be derived. Sartre writes "no general code of ethics can tell you what you ought to do" (33), and that any universal values are in "perpetual construction" (43) through individual choices.

Systemizing Existentialist Ethics

We will use Zheng's account of the perfect / imperfect system of duties to systemize existentialist notions of ethics. Under the strong view of imperfect actions, both imperative and aspirational notions of morality are accommodated by perfect and imperfect actions respectively, incorporating summative and formative criticism to do so. By using this system in an existentialist context, we can show that existentialism can provide a sound and meaningful ethical system.

First, freedom can be considered a perfect duty, one that takes the form of "always do freedom". It can also be considered the only one. It is permissible to perform summative moral criticism on those who shirk it, but not strictly necessary: as Beauvoir mentions, people are not always put in a situation where they can be blamed for not following it (even if they ought to in strict terms).

Other values represent imperfect duties. They are held in the strong, aspirational sense, where in no circumstances should one be judged for not fulfilling them in an individual situation. People can only judge each other on these imperfect duties through formative moral criticism: summative moral criticism (and the implicit blame that goes along with it) is wholly inappropriate for values that 1. are not necessarily shared with others and 2. have no backing in essence and thus not objectively correct. Instead, we can use formative moral criticism to encourage others to follow their aspirational values more closely.

Furthermore, not only is the degree of adherence to these aspirations in constant evolution, but the aspirations themselves are as well. Instead of following pre-delineated values, humans challenge each other to consistently update what values they aspire to, always towards the purpose of embracing their true freedom, in order to form Sartre's notion of constructed human universality.

A Defense of This System

In order to defend this system and thus show that existentialism can provide a sound moral system more broadly, we must show throughout its structure that it can give clear moral criticisms and guidance while remaining logically compatible with existential philosophy.

We first consider the role of freedom as the one and only perfect duty. It is relatively straightforward how a perfect duty like freedom can give moral guidance: it calls on the agent no matter what the situation is. Actions that increase (will) freedom are good and those that decrease (deny) freedom are bad. In situations where this is indeterminate (e.g. Sartre's French soldier), other considerations can play more of a factor. In addition, it is a natural extension of existential philosophy as argued in Existentialism as a Humanism: without the concept of radical freedom existentialism loses its meaning altogether. However, we also must prove why freedom's special status in existentialist ethics reinforces the soundness of the system as a whole as a moral system.

Freedom is sound as a singular perfect duty because it is fundamentally distinct in its effect on future self-actualization. In any situation where one loses freedom for oneself or others, they limit the potential effect of their actions in the future and thus discount their own agency. This hollows out the very meaning of an aspiration, especially towards imperfect duties. Even if someone puts in a full effort in the future to fulfill an imperfect duty, the effort could fall short as a result of a present loss of freedom. For instance, if someone elects to not register to vote⁴ before an upcoming election and subsequently cannot vote for their desired outcome, they harm the right to claim aspiration for whatever political causes they believe in, no matter how many petitions they sign or protests they participate in after the fact.

The other component that we must consider is that of imperfect duties – the remaining morals that humans construct over time. We must answer why they must be aspirational rather than imperative (which would make moral criticism relatively "easy") under existentialism. We then can explain how "even" an aspirational notion of these duties delivers a sound ethical system.

Principally, these duties cannot be imperative due to the core contention of existentialism preceding essentialism. With no essential basis for values other than freedom, one cannot enforce these values on others imperatively without them constituting an arbitrary code of ethics. One cannot (from a just perspective) say "always (or never) do x" under threat of sanction if x is not itself a ground truth: one can only hope that others eventually do more (or less) of x in an aspirational, blameless manner. Additionally, aspirational values do not prescribe specific actions in specific circumstances, but instead give humans a continual choice in how to best fulfill their aspirations. This best preserves the existentialist notion of radical freedom for individuals.

At the same time, these aspirational, imperfect duties help give moral guidance for a wider range of scenarios than can be adjudicated with freedom alone. Sartre identifies several charges against his conception of existentialist ethics: charges of subjectivism claim that existentialism overlooks human solidarity, while those of moral nihilism criticize existentialism as unable to provide grounds to judge any actions morally.

Towards the first, aspirational duties lend further credence to Sartre's argument that ethical choices necessarily define a broader image of humanity. Aspirations, under formative moral criticism, allow people to encourage others to work towards shared goals without blaming them for either shortcomings or differences in other goals resulting from existence, implicitly elevating the concept of a shared humanity over marginal differences in existence⁵.

Towards the second, in addition to the normative value of freedom allowing for direct judgement in some cases, aspirational duties can fill in the remaining. While one cannot criticize others for not complying with one's aspirations, through the concepts of bad faith and radical freedom, one can still encourage others to live up to their own expectations (providing moral support without judgement) or criticize their aspirations as held in bad faith (for instance, Beauvoir opposing women's domestic aspirations not because they "made women unhappy" (Coffin, 2020, p. 178), but instead because they represent the default option for someone denying their own radical freedom).

Thus, existentialism is able to provide a set of perfect and imperfect duties with sufficient moral force to constitute a sound ethical system.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I systemize existentialist ethics under a bimodal view of morality before defending my characterization in both its compatibility with existentialism and its ability to give moral guidance to show that existentialism can provide a sound ethical system.

There remain several outstanding objections. While "willing freedom for oneself and others" being a perfect duty refutes charges of moral nihilism in some sense (there does exist a higher moral value under existentialism), it does not completely address how to prioritize freedom for oneself versus others. Sartre argues that one cannot entirely neglect to will freedom for others while willing freedom for oneself (solving the "authentic Nazi" problem as Nazis tend to remove the freedom of others), as the former is necessary for the latter, but the question remains of how much individual freedom one ought to sacrifice in the service of that of others.

In addition, as any existentialist ethical theory cannot define the specific nature of imperfect duties (aspirations), as existentialism definitionally calls upon individuals to do so themselves (in contrast to something like virtue ethics where Aristotle et al. explicitly list out virtues), one can argue that proving the soundness of a system of existentialist ethics (outside of the value of freedom) is vacuous as one does not directly prescribe anything to critique.

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